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 Palestinian Suicide Bombing Revisited:
 A Critique of the Outbidding Thesis
 ROBERT J. BRYM
 BADER ARAJ
 Social scientists have argued that numerous factors motivate the
 outbreak of waves of Palestinian suicide attacks. These factors include the de
 sire to liberate occupied territory, disrupt peace negotiations, seek retaliation
 and revenge, and win popular support by "outbidding" internal political com
 petitors, using suicide attacks as a kind of currency in the bidding war.1 Recently,
 an attempt has begun to disentangle the factors listed above by showing that
 motives are often mixed and their relative importance varies in different cir
 cumstances.2 In this paper we continue that effort by focusing on the outbid
 Respectively: Robert A. Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York:
 Random House, 2005); Andrew Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, "Sabotaging the Peace: The Politics of
 Extremist Violence," International Organization 56 (Spring 2002): 263-296; Rui J. de Figueiredo and
 Barry R. Weingast, "Vicious Cycles: Endogenous Political Extremism and Political Violence," 2001,
 accessed on the website of the Institute of Governmental Studies, University of California, Berkeley
 at http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1006&context=igs, 16 November 2005;
 and Mia M. Bloom, "Palestinian Suicide Bombing: Public Support, Market Share, and Outbidding,"
 Political Science Quarterly 119 (Spring 2004): 61-88; Mia M. Bloom, Dying to Kill: The Allure of Sui
 cide Terror (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005).
 2 Robert J. Brym and Bader Araj, "Suicide Bombing as Strategy and Interaction: The Case of the
 Second Intifada^ Social Forces 84 (June 2006): 1969-1986; Robert J. Brym, "Six Lessons of Suicide
 Bombers," Contexts 6 (Fall 2007): 40-45; Robert J. Brym, "Religion, Politics, and Suicide Bombing:
 An Interpretive Essay," Canadian Journal of Sociology 33 (Winter 2008): 89-108, accessed on the web
 site of the Canadian Journal of Sociology at http://ejournals.library.ualberta.ca/index.php/CJS/article/
 view/1537/1061, 29 May 2008; Bader Araj, "Harsh State Repression as a Cause of Suicide Bombing:
 The Case of the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 31 (April 2008): 284-303.
 ROBERT J. BRYM is professor of sociology at the University of Toronto. He has published widely on
 the social bases of Russian and Canadian politics and is now researching collective and state violence in
 Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza during the second intifada. His recent articles on the latter subject have
 appeared in Social Forces, Contexts, and The Canadian Journal of Sociology. BADER ARAJ is a doc
 toral student in the Department of Sociology at the University of Toronto. He is completing his dis
 sertation on suicide bombing in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza during the second intifada. His recent
 articles on this subject have appeared in Social Forces and Studies in Conflict and Terrorism.
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 ding thesis, most forcefully stated by Mia Bloom in Political Science Quarterly.3
 Our analysis leads us to conclude that the explanatory power of the outbidding
 thesis is considerably weaker than Bloom makes it appear and that an alterna
 tive explanation is required. We propose an alternative below.
 Bloom's goal is to "account for the variance in public support for [suicide]
 operations over time."4 She attempts to do so by underlining the intense po
 litical competition that took place among Palestinian organizations in the
 context of widespread and mounting disillusion, anger, and despair at the end
 of 2000.
 In September 2000, peace negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians
 broke down, bringing to a bitter end the optimism that greeted the signing of
 the Oslo Accords seven years earlier. The Palestinian economy was in ruins. Ariel
 Sharon, facing a challenge from the right wing of his Likud Party, provocatively
 visited the Temple Mount (al-Haram alSharif) to reinforce his nationalist cre
 dentials.5 Rioting broke out immediately and Israel responded aggressively.
 According to Bloom, this was the context in which various political or
 ganizations competed against each other for the leadership of the Palestin
 ian community:
 With every major [suicide] attack since November 2000, support for suicide bomb
 ings has increased and support for the Palestinian Authority has decreased. In
 addition to building support for martyrdom, groups that use the tactic become
 more popular. The support for militant Islamic movements appears to capture
 previously non-aligned groups among the Palestinians, demonstrating that mar
 tyrdom operations boost the organizational profile of the groups using them.6
 Some data concerning the involvement of Palestinian political organiza
 tions in suicide attacks are consistent with Bloom's argument (see Table 1).
 For example, suicide attacks were first initiated by Islamic fundamentalist or
 ganizations (Palestinian Islamic Jihad [PIJ] and Hamas) and were only taken
 up fourteen months later by secular, nationalist organizations (the Popular
 Front for the Liberation of Palestine [PFLP] and the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade
 [AMB], the latter associated with Fatah). It is possible that the leaders of fun
 damentalist organizations saw suicide attacks as a means of increasing popular
 support and undermining the legitimacy of the Palestinian Authority in the cri
 sis that developed at the end of 2000. It is also possible that secular, nationalist
 organizations, fearing a slide in popular trust, responded by launching their
 own suicide operations in 2001. The number of organizations involved in sui
 cide attacks increased over time (from one in 2000 to five in 2004) and no sin
 3 Bloom, "Palestinian Suicide Bombing."
 4 Ibid., 65.
 5 Amos Harel and Avi Isacharoff, ha-Milkhama ha-ShvVit: Aikh Nitzakhnu v'Lama Hifsadnu ba
 Milkhama im ha-Falestinim (Hebrew: The Seventh War: How We Won and Why We Lost the War with
 the Palestinians) (Tel Aviv: Yediot Akhronot, 2004), 14.
 6 Bloom, "Palestinian Suicide Bombing," 61-62; Bloom, Dying to Kill, 70.
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 TABLE 1
 Organizational Involvements in Suicide Bombings, 26 October 2000 to 12 July 2005 (in percent)
 Political Organization 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
 Palestinian Islamic Jihad 100 26 24 19 16 50
 Hamas 0 71 22 44 32 50
 Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 0 3 8 7 11 0
 al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (Fatah) 0 0 45 30 37 0
 Popular Resistance Committee 0 0 0 0 5 0
 Total 100 100 99a 100 101a 100
 Number of involvements 2 31 49 27 19 2
 Number of organizations involved_1_3_4_4_5_2^
 Sources: See note 9.
 aDoes not equal 100 because of rounding.
 gle organization dominated suicide attacks for more than a year at a time. This
 pattern is also consistent with the view that organizations used suicide attacks
 as a currency for outbidding rivals in the competition for popular support.
 It is, however, difficult to reconstruct the intentions of organizational lead
 ers, not least because the historical record is fragmentary and often self-serving.
 Fortunately, therefore, the empirical basis of Bloom's argument lies in the
 realm of popular support for suicide attacks and the organizations that initiate
 them. We can rely on public opinion polls for data on these subjects.
 One hypothesis that we can derive from Bloom's work and that readily
 lends itself to empirical testing is the following:
 HI: Increased frequency of suicide bombing was followed by increased
 popular support for the tactic.
 This hypothesis is not central to Bloom's argument, however, because it
 says nothing about whether organizations increase their popularity by adopt
 ing suicide bombing as a tactic. Bloom is ambiguous on the latter issue. She
 first holds that frequency of suicide bombing resulted in declining popular sup
 port for the Palestinian Authority and the overwhelmingly dominant organiza
 tion within it?Fatah. She then asserts that organizations employing suicide
 bombing as a tactic enjoyed increasing popular support. Yet through its affili
 ate, the AMB, Fatah was responsible for nearly 30 percent of all suicide at
 tacks during the second intifada. Since it cannot be the case that when Fatah
 engaged in suicide bombing it enjoyed both decreasing and increasing support,
 one or both of Bloom's organizational arguments must be false. Despite this
 inconsistency, we test both possibilities:
 H2: Increased frequency of suicide bombings by all organizations was
 followed by decreased popular support for Fatah.
 H3A: Increased frequency of suicide bombing by Fatah (through the
 AMB) was followed by increased popular support for Fatah.
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 H3B: Increased frequency of suicide bombing by Hamas was followed by
 increased popular support for Hamas.
 Let us consider each of our hypotheses in turn.
 Correlates of Suicide Bombing
 Between December 2000 and December 2004, a series of public opinion polls
 asked representative samples of Palestinians about their support for Palestin
 ian political organizations and suicide attacks on Israelis. Bloom cited data
 from these polls in her work and we follow suit below.7 We corrected six errors
 she made in recording the poll results, most seriously (because the error
 adds considerable weight to her case) the remarkably high 85 percent support
 for suicide bombing in September 2001. (This was actually the figure for sup
 port of military operations excluding suicide bombing-, no data are available on
 support for suicide bombing in September 2001.) In addition, we determined
 the number of suicide attacks that took place in the month preceding each poll.
 We would have preferred to use data on the frequency of attempted suicide
 attacks since Israeli action to counter suicide bombers is a key variable affect
 ing the number of suicide bombings. Unfortunately, such data are available
 only on a yearly basis from the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs so we had
 to content ourselves with data on the number of suicide attacks that are re
 ported in our sources. In most cases, we were also able to identify the organiza
 tions that took responsibility for the attacks.8 From these data we constructed
 Table 2, which shows bivariate correlations for key variables relevant to the out
 bidding thesis.
 7 "Palestine Opinion Pulse," 2005, accessed on the website of the Jerusalem Media and Commu
 nication Center at http://www.jmcc.org/publicpoll/opinion.html, 14 November 2005; Bloom, "Palestin
 ian Suicide Bombing," 68, 70.
 8 We define suicide bombing as the use of explosives against one or more people by one or more
 attackers. The attackers enjoy organizational support and know in advance and with certainty that
 their action will result in their death. By our definition, merely planning an attack does not qualify as
 a suicide bombing; the attacker must be en route to his or her target. Nor is death or injury a necessary
 part of our definition since on occasion a suicide bomber is apprehended and disarmed after an attack
 has been launched but before detonation and the incident is subsequently publicized. Three suicide
 bombings listed by Israeli sources do not qualify as such by our definition. Fourteen suicide bombings
 by our definition are not listed as such by Israeli sources. See "Search the Incidents & Casualties
 Database," accessed on the website of the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism at
 http://www.ict.org.il, 1 November 2004; "Palestinian violence and terrorism since September 2000,"
 accessed on the website of the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/
 Terrorism-+Obstacle+to+Peace/Palestinian+terror+since+2000/Palestinian % 20violence % 20and %
 20terrorism%20since%20September, 1 November 2004; William Robert Johnston, "Chronology of
 Terrorist Attacks in Israel, Part IV: 1993-2000," accessed at http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/terrorism/
 terrisrael-4.html, 25 October 2004; New York Times, East Coast Final Edition, 2000-2005; al-Quds (Ar
 abic: Jerusalem), 2000-2005; al-Quds al-Arabi (Arabic: Arab Jerusalem), 2000-2005.
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 TABLE 2
 Correlates of Suicide Bombing, December 2000-December 2004 (n in parentheses)
 Variables Bivariate Correlation
 H1. Lagged suicide bombings and popular support for suicide bombings 0.516 (11)
 H2. Lagged suicide bombings and popular support for Fatah -0.033 (13)
 H3A. Lagged suicide bombings by Fatah and popular support for Fatah 0.015 (13)
 H3B. Lagged suicide bombings by Hamas and popular support for Hamas -0.117 (13)
 H6. Popular support for suicide bombings and popular support for Fatah_0.958* (4)
 Sources: "Palestine Opinion Pulse" and sources cited in note 9.
 *p < 0.05, one-tailed.
 According to HI, frequency of suicide bombing at time 1 was followed by
 increasing popular support for the tactic at time 2. Our data fail to support the
 hypothesis. The correlation between popular support for suicide bombing and
 the frequency of suicide bombings in the preceding month just fails to reach
 statistical significance at the 0.05 level.
 Nor do the data support H2. The correlation between popular support
 for Fatah and the frequency of suicide bombings by all organizations in the
 preceding month is not statistically significant. Finally, the data fail to support
 hypotheses H3A and H3B. Increased popular support for Fatah was not
 preceded by a statistically significant increase in the frequency of suicide
 bombings by Fatah. Nor was increased popular support for Hamas preceded
 by a statistically significant increase in the frequency of suicide bombings by
 Hamas. The correlations relevant to HI, H2, H3A, and H3B are likely due
 to chance. Our results are uniformly disappointing from the point of view of
 the outbidding thesis.9
 Three Principles of Group Conflict
 How then can we explain variation over time in support for, and use of, suicide
 missions by Palestinians? One possibility is suggested by students of inter
 group conflict. Georg Simmel and Lewis Coser argue that inter-group conflict
 usually increases group cohesion. As group members come into conflict with
 others, they typically mobilize resources to defend themselves, intensify inter
 nal social interaction, draw stark boundaries between themselves and their op
 ponents, accentuate common values, and develop a heightened sense of group
 trust, identity, and loyalty.10
 Simmel and Coser also contend that intergroup conflict often leads to co
 operation among previously unrelated or even antagonistic organizations within
 groups. The need to cooperate arises from the common goal of group survival,
 9 We arrived at essentially the same results using nonl?gged independent variables.
 10 Lewis Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (New York: Free Press, 1956), 87-103.
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 which, in the face of protracted and intense intergroup conflict, overrides the
 less salient interests that previously separated the organizations.11
 Finally, as Mark Lichbach argues in perhaps the most frequently cited ar
 ticle on the relationship between repression and collective action, protest or
 ganizations choose tactics that maximize benefits and minimize costs. When an
 opponent represses the use of a chosen tactic, thus increasing its cost, organi
 zation members tend to replace it with another tactic. For example, the substi
 tution of less violent tactics for more violent tactics is largely a response to the
 repression of less violent tactics by opponents.12
 Among the testable hypotheses that may be derived from the principles of
 group conflict just outlined, the following are relevant in the present context:
 H4: In the face of repression of less violent tactics, protest organiza
 tions tend to choose more violent tactics. For example, in the Pales
 tinian case we may expect that the introduction of suicide bombing
 by a protest organization was preceded by extreme repression of
 that organization.
 H5: Extreme repression of protest activities typically encourages mem
 bers of organizations to pool resources and cooperate at least on a
 tactical level so that they can continue to engage in protest. For ex
 ample, in the Palestinian case we may expect that suicide bombing
 operations were sometimes characterized by tactical cooperation
 among previously antagonistic organizations.
 H6: As involvement in violent conflict increases, so does social solidarity.
 Following Durkheim (see below), heightened social solidarity should
 cause the rates of different types of suicide to change, and trust in
 authoritative institutions to increase. For example, in the Palestinian
 case we may expect that increased social solidarity caused the rate of
 suicide bombing to rise and the rate of what Durkheim called "ego
 istic" and "anomic" suicide to fall. We may also expect that increasing
 support for suicide bombing was associated with increasing trust in
 Fatah, the dominant political organization at the time.
 Testing these hypotheses is the next task we set ourselves.
 Violence (H4)
 Bloom writes that suicide bombing allows "organizations which use the tactic
 to reap multiple benefits without incurring significant costs."13 We find the cost
 side of her ledger implausible. After their experience with the consequences of
 11 Ibid., 139-149.
 12 Mark Lichbach, "Deterrence or Escalation? The Puzzle of Aggregate Studies of Repression and
 Dissent," Journal of Conflict Resolution 31 (June 1987): 266-297.
 13 Bloom, Dying to Kill, 76.
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 suicide bombing from 1993 to 1997, it is inconceivable that Palestinian organi
 zational leaders at the beginning of the second intifada were unaware that the
 reintroduction of suicide bombing would be costly. International condemna
 tion, frozen bank accounts, mass arrests, violent reprisals (including the assas
 sination of organizational leaders), and the disruption of operations by Israeli
 counterterrorist forces followed hard on the heels of suicide bombings. Yet de
 spite these high costs, Palestinian insurgents employed the tactic throughout
 the second intifada. They did so because other tactics were found to be more
 costly still. As Robert Pape notes: "When rebels are strong enough to achieve
 their territorial aims through conventional or guerilla means alone, there is lit
 tle reason for them to accept the disapproval and costs that follow from resort
 ing to suicide terrorism."14 We concur with Pape's view that suicide bombing is
 usually a costly weapon of last resort.
 Support for the view that Palestinian insurgents switch tactics when the cost
 of employing current tactics becomes too high was first suggested by Marwan
 Khawaja. In his quantitative analysis of data on collective action in the West Bank
 from 1976 to 1985, he found that, in general, the exercise of high levels of most
 forms of state repression led to increased rioting and other forms of violent col
 lective action on the part of the Palestinians.15 Similarly, in her recent, qualitative
 analysis of counterinsurgency and rebellion during the first and second intifadas,
 Ruth Margolies Beitler convincingly demonstrated that "the implementation
 of Israeli counterinsurgency tactics since 1967 was a major factor influencing
 the Palestinians' choice of tactics and subsequently their decision to resort to
 mass rebellion in 1987, but also to revert to more violent tactics in 2000."16
 Three Turning Points
 The pattern that Khawaja and Beitler discerned?increased state repression
 leading to the adoption of alternative and, in this case, more violent insurgent
 tactics?is also visible in three turning points in the history of the second
 intifada: the first use of suicide bombing during the second intifada in 2000,
 the first use of suicide bombing by a secular Palestinian organization in
 2001, and the first use of suicide bombing by Fatah, the leading secular, na
 tionalist Palestinian organization in 2002. Each of these turning points was pre
 cipitated by heightened repression on the part of Israeli forces that sharply
 increased the cost to Palestinian insurgents of using alternative tactics.
 The first suicide bombing of the second intifada. The first riot of the sec
 ond intifada broke out on the esplanade of al-Aqsa Mosque in September
 14 Pape, Dying to Win, 30.
 15 Marwan Khawaja, "Repression and Popular Collective Action: Evidence from the West Bank,"
 Sociological Forum 8 (Winter 1993): 47-71.
 16 Ruth Margolies Beitler, The Path to Mass Rebellion: An Analysis of Two Intifadas (Lanham,
 MD: Lexington Books, 2004), xii.
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 2000. Israel's reaction to the rock throwing was highly aggressive, even by the
 admission of its own officials.17 Security forces fired live ammunition into the
 crowd, killing seven people. The rioting spread quickly, and by the end of
 the year, Israeli security forces had killed 319 Palestinians. (In the same period,
 Israeli victims totaled 43, including 22 civilians.)18 In the face of such extreme
 repression, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, a fundamentalist Islamic organization,
 shifted tactics and launched the first suicide attack of the second intifada. A
 man riding a bicycle, who appeared to be heading toward an Israeli Army out
 post at the entrance to the Jewish settlement of Kisufim in Gaza, struck a
 concrete barrier, detonating his bomb and wounding a soldier. In a press re
 lease, PIJ took responsibility for the attack and clearly implied that the oper
 ation was a reaction to the killing of Palestinians during the first days of the
 intifada; it named the cell responsible for the operation the "al-Aqsa martyrs
 cell," for the first time invoking the image of al-Aqsa Mosque in the name
 of suicide bombing and in honor of those who died on the mosque's espla
 nade.19 The suicide operation may also have been timed to coincide with the
 anniversary of the assassination of PIJ's founder, Fathi al-Shiqaqi, by Mossad
 agents in Malta in 1995. Subsequent "firsts" made it clear that there is often a
 connection between suicide bombings and the assassination of Palestinian or
 ganizational leaders by Israel.20
 The first suicide bombing by a secular organization. On 27 August 2001,
 Israeli forces assassinated the Secretary-General of the Popular Front for
 the Liberation of Palestine, Abu Ali Mustafa (Mustafa Zubari), in a missile
 strike on his office in Ramallah in the West Bank. Earlier Israeli assassinations
 had been restricted to field operatives and local militia commanders who had
 been involved in suicide missions; this was the first to involve the head of a
 militant organization. A few hours after the assassination, Palestinian gunmen
 shot and killed a Jewish settler. A caller to Reuters said the shooting was only
 the first act of revenge by the PFLP. The shooting was followed by the spec
 tacular assassination of the far-right Israeli Minister of Tourism, Rehavam
 17 Raviv Drucker and Ofer Shelah, Boomerang: Kishalon ha-Manhigut ba-Intifada ha-Shniya
 (Hebrew: Boomerang: The Failure of Leadership in the Second Intifada), (Jerusalem: Keter, 2005),
 28; Luca Ricolfi, "Palestinians, 1981-2003" in Diego Gambetta, ed., Making Sense of Suicide Missions
 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 94.
 18 Amal Jamal, The Palestinian National Movement: Politics of Contention, 1967-2005 (Blooming
 ton: Indiana University Press, 2005), 157; Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2005, special tab
 ulation on Palestinians killed in the al-Aqsa intifada (in Arabic); "Victims of Palestinian Violence and
 Terrorism since September 2000," accessed on the website of the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs at
 http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism-+Obstacle+to+Peace/Palestinian+terror+since+2000/Victims %
 20of%20Palestinian%20Violence%20and%20Terrorism%20sinc, 25 January 2006.
 19 "Umalieh Intihariah PJihad al-Islami Tustuhdif Muqe'a Israelia fi Qita' Ghaza," (Arabic: "A
 Suicide Operation by the Islamic Jihad against an Israeli Position") al-Quds al-Arabi, 27 October
 2000, 5.
 20 For details concerning this link, see Brym and Araj, "Suicide Bombing," 2006.
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 Ze'evi, in a Jerusalem hotel on 17 October and, on the same day, the first suicide
 bombing involving a secular, nationalist organization. The suicide attack oc
 curred at Kibbutz Nakhal Oz between Israel and the Gaza Strip. Nobody was
 killed except the bomber. Two Israeli soldiers were wounded. The military wing
 of the PFLP declared in a press release that the assassination of Ze'evi and the
 suicide bombing were responses to the assassination of Abu Ali Mustafa. PFLP
 activists used loudspeakers to broadcast the same message in the Gaza Strip.21
 Here again we see that an important turning point in the second intifada involv
 ing suicide bombing was preceded by an escalation of Israeli repression.
 The first suicide bombing by Fatah (AMB). On 14 January 2002, Israeli
 forces assassinated Raed al-Karmi, a folk hero and leader of an AMB militia
 in Tulkarem in the West Bank, by detonating a high-powered bomb beside
 his house. Within hours, the AMB issued a press release entitled "Revenge is
 Coming" {al-Intiqm Qadim) and ambushed some Israeli soldiers just east of
 Tulkarem, killing one and injuring another.22 It was the first of a series of in
 creasingly violent attacks over the next two weeks, culminating in the suicide
 mission of 27 January. On that day a Fatah-affiliated attacker detonated a pow
 erful bomb on a busy Jerusalem street corner during lunch hour. The bomber
 and an elderly Israeli were killed. Eleven Israelis were seriously wounded and
 more than 150 others were treated for shock and lacerations from flying glass
 and other debris. In an interview with a New York Times reporter the day after
 al-Karmi's assassination, his comrades insisted they would stand by precedent
 and avoid suicide attacks.23 It did not take long for them to change their mind.
 We conclude that in the face of repression of less violent tactics, groups
 often tend to choose more violent tactics. If, as we have argued, competition
 among Palestinian organizations seems to have contributed relatively little
 to the introduction and persistent use of suicide bombing during the second
 intifada, we are obliged to conclude that conflict between the Israeli state
 and Palestinian organizations over territorial control seems to have contrib
 uted a great deal.
 Cooperation (H5)
 Palestinian organizations have been intensely competitive for decades. They
 have jockeyed for power and legitimacy, promoted conflicting goals, and vied
 21 "Felsteeni Yufujer Nufssuh ya Ausseb Jundiein Bijorouh," (Arabic: "A Palestinian Blows Him
 self Up and Injures Two Soldiers") al-Quds, 18 October 2001,1,18; James Bennet, "Widening Hos
 tilities, Israel Kills Chief of P.L.O. Faction," New York Times, 28 August 2001, A6; James Bennet,
 "Far-Right Leader Is Slain in Israel; A Blow to Peace," New York Times, 18 October 2000, Al, A10.
 22 ?Hurekut Fatih Turud ula Ightiyial Ahud Ashiteeha," (Arabic: "Fatah Movement Reacts to the
 Assassination of One of its Activists") al-Quds al-Arabi, 15 January 2002, 1.
 23 James Bennet, "Key Militia Leader Dies in Bomb Blast in the West Bank," New York Times,
 15 January 2002.
This content downloaded from 213.244.124.19 on Thu, 12 Jan 2017 10:06:11 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 494 I POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY
 for the trust and support of the public. Local leaders have clashed with leaders
 in-exile; Islamic fundamentalist leaders have quarreled with secular, nationalist
 leaders; and senior, upper-tier leaders have been at odds with junior, middle
 tier leaders. We know little about the conditions that exacerbate political
 competition among Palestinian organizations. We do know that political com
 petition has not been constant. It has been more intense in some periods than
 others. Nor has political competition been monolithic. It has been more evi
 dent at the level of ideology and strategy than at the level of tactics. We believe
 that in the face of high levels of Israeli repression during the second intifada,
 political competition among Palestinian organizations became somewhat sub
 dued and some signs of tactical cooperation emerged (H5).
 Soon after the rioting began in September 2000, Israel altered its techniques
 of repression and began arresting and detaining large number of Palestinians,
 a policy it pursued with increasing vigor throughout the second intifada. In
 November 2000, it started assassinating Palestinian field operatives and militia
 commanders, extending its targets to upper-tier leaders in October 2001. Also
 in October 2001, Israel resumed demolishing homes owned by the families of
 people involved in anti-Israel activities, a practice it had abandoned in 1997. In
 March 2002, following a rash of especially horrific suicide bombings, Israel re
 occupied most of the West Bank and parts of Gaza and started conducting
 house-to-house searches to eradicate the infrastructure of the insurgency.
 One effect of these counterinsurgency techniques was to encourage some
 level of tactical cooperation among Palestinian organizations as a matter of
 necessity. In August 2001, The Economist reported that "Israel's policy of
 assassinating Hamas and Fatah men alike has encouraged the formation
 of cross-factional groups, binding together the national and Islamic resis
 tance."24 We calculate that 8 percent of suicide and guerilla attacks between
 September 2000 and July 2005 involved participants from more than one or
 ganization, and an additional unknown (but undoubtedly larger) percentage
 involved logistical cooperation between organizations.25 As one Palestinian po
 litical scientist correctly observed:
 The core of the PA's [Palestinian Authority's] loyalists not only supported Hamas's
 actions, but also participated in them. On the eve of the Camp David negotiations
 of July 2000 and especially upon their failure, Fatah's leaders were, in their deter
 mination to frustrate Israel's policies of occupation and settlement, not far from
 the declared position of Hamas's leadership. This change in Fatah's position
 24 "The consequences of selective killing; Israel and the Palestinians," The Economist 360, 8233
 (4 August 2001), 40.
 25 "al-Muquemuh Kubedit al-Ado al-Suhioni Alf Kutteel yu 6 Alaf Jureeh Khilal 'Intifadut al
 Aqsa'... Nusfuhum Husselut al-Hassad al-Qussami," (Arabic: "The Resistance Inflicted 1,000 Deaths
 and 6,000 Injuries on the Zionist Enemy in the 'al-Aqsa Intifada'... Half of them Killed by the al
 Qassam Battalions"), accessed on the website of Hizballah at http://www.moqawama.org/israel.php,
 29 January 2006.
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 closed the gap between activists of the rival movements, leading to common mil
 itary and suicide activities against the Israeli army and settlers and other Israeli
 civilians. In contrast to previous clashes between Fatah and Hamas activists, the
 new public mood facilitated cooperative military operations.26
 Israeli political scientists Ami Pedahzur and Arie Perliger recently provided
 additional evidence supporting observations of inter-organizational coopera
 tion. They identified and analyzed members of four networks of Palestinian
 militants who were engaged in suicide missions. The networks ranged in size
 from 22 to 49 members and operated in Nablus, northern Samaria, Hebron,
 and Jenin, one of them in 1996 and three in the period 2000-2004. The net
 work that was active in 1996, before the outbreak of the second intifada,
 was comprised of Hamas members exclusively. The networks that were active
 during the second intifada, when Israeli repression was much suffer, were each
 dominated by one organization but contained a significant admixture of
 members of other organizations. Pedahzur and Perliger comment: "Some of
 the suicide attacker cells ... were comprised of youths who belonged to differ
 ent groups, so that if one speaks of any type of association among the groups, it
 is more a matter of cooperation than competition."27
 Social Solidarity (H6)
 The conflict with Israel and, in particular, Israel's use of extreme repression
 during the second intifada caused more than just increased cooperation among
 Palestinian organizations. In general, the conflict increased Palestinian social
 solidarity. Heightened social solidarity, in turn, had important consequences
 for patterns of suicidal behavior and trust in authority.
 In Durkheim's usage, social solidarity refers to the frequency of inter
 action, the sharing of values, and the sense of trust that exist in any social
 collectivity to varying degrees. Indicative of a collectivity's level of social sol
 idarity are the types and rates of suicide that may be observed within it. For
 example, if social solidarity is low, individuals may be poorly integrated into
 the groups to which they belong and they consequently tend to disregard rules
 of behavior that are not based on their private interests. They may also be
 poorly regulated by collective norms so there is little control over the limits
 of their needs and passions. High rates of "egoistic" and "anomic" suicide
 are typical in such settings according to Durkheim. In contrast, if social soli
 darity is high there is little space for individuality because collective life is
 too intense to allow for the expression of individual needs, passions, and per
 sonality development. In such cases, when a person commits suicide, it is typ
 ically "not because he assumes the right to do so but, on the contrary, because
 26 Jamal, The Palestinian National Movement, 154.
 27 Ami Pedahzur and Arie Perliger, "The Changing Nature of Suicide Attacks: A Social Network
 Perspective," Social Forces 84 (June 2006): 1987-2008.
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 it is his duty"1* Accordingly, Durkheim refers to suicide committed in condi
 tions of high social solidarity as "altruistic suicide." Suicide missions are a form
 of altruistic suicide in the Durkheimian sense. It is only under conditions of
 moderate integration and regulation that egoistic, anomic, and altruistic sui
 cide rates are low.
 If, as we have argued, the conflict with Israel heightened social solidarity
 among Palestinians, we should observe a relatively low level of egoistic and ano
 mic suicide and a relatively high level of altruistic suicide in Palestinian society,
 especially during periods of intense collective violence. This is indeed what we
 find during the second intifada (see Figure 1). Between 2001 and 2004, the rate
 of altruistic suicide (the number of suicide bombers who died during their mis
 sions per 100,000 Palestinians) averaged 1.0 (or 33 people per year) while the
 rate of anomic and egoistic suicide averaged just 0.4 (or 13 people per year). The
 curves for the rate of altruistic and anomic/egoistic suicide are not quite mirror
 images of each other, but the high point for altruistic suicide (2002) did witness a
 sharp decline in the rate of anomic/egoistic suicide. (The curve for the rate of
 attempted anomic/egoistic suicide, not shown in Figure 1, is an almost perfect
 mirror image of the curve for the rate of altruistic suicide.)29
 If the conflict with Israel heightened social solidarity among Palestinians,
 the level of support for suicide bombing should have been positively associated
 with the level of support for authoritative organizations. And in fact, in line
 with H6, during the second intifada the correlation between popular support
 for suicide bombing and popular support for Fatah, the most popular and
 trusted political organization in Palestinian society at the time, was strong, pos
 itive, and statistically significant (r = 0.958; see Table 2). We thus see that, to
 the degree that conflict with Israel heightened social solidarity in Palestinian
 society, it had the Durkheimian consequences one would expect.
 28 Emile Durkheim, Suicide: A Study in Sociology, G. Simpson, ed., J. Spaulding and G. Simpson,
 trans. (New York: Free Press 1951 [1897]), 219, emphasis in the original.
 29 Anomic/egoistic and attempted anomic/egoistic suicide data are from Palestinian Central Bu
 reau of Statistics, 2006, "Reported and Attempted Suicide in the Palestinian Territory by Region,
 2001-2004," special tabulation. Population data for the year 2000 are from the home page of the
 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2005, accessed at http://www.pcbs.org/, 9 September 2005.
 We assume a 4 percent annual rate of population increase after 2000. Altruistic suicide data are
 our calculations from the sources cited in note 9. Nadia Taysir Dabbagh's data from the period just
 before, during, and just after the first intifada show that during the first intifada the anomic/egoistic
 suicide rate remained low and steady while the attempted anomic/egoistic suicide rate dipped. See
 Nadia Taysir Dabbagh, Suicide in Palestine: Narratives of Despair (Northampton MA: Olive Branch
 Press, 2005), 129, 131-132. Incidentally, increases in social solidarity as indicated by periodic collec
 tive religious celebrations are associated with a decline in the anomic/egoistic suicide rate among Pal
 estinians but not, apparently, with an increase in the altruistic suicide rate. This pattern is compatible
 with the view that culture plays an independent role in shaping suicidal behavior. See Dabbagh,
 Suicide in Palestine, 98; T.K. Daradkeh, "Parasuicide during Ramadan in Jordan," Acta Psychiatrica
 Scandinavica 86 (February, 1992): 253-254; Cynthia Hamlin and Robert J. Brym "The Return of the
 Native: A Cultural and Social-psychological Critique of Durkheim's Suicide Based on the Guarani
 Kaiow? of Southwestern Brazil," Sociological Theory 24 (Winter 2006): 42-57.
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 FIGURE 1




 2001  2002 2003
 Year
 2004
 Sources: see notes 8 and 29.
 For anomic/egoistic suicide: Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2006, "Reported and Attempted
 Suicide in the Palestinian Territory by Region, 2001-2004," special tabulation; for population data: Pales
 tinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2005, accessed at http://www.pcbs.org/, 9 September 2005; for
 altruistic suicide: "Search the Incidents & Casualties Database," accessed on the website of the Inter
 national Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism at http://www.ict.org.ill, 1 November 2004; "Palestinian
 violence and terrorism since September 2000," accessed on the website of the Israel Ministry of Foreign
 Affairs at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism-+Obstacle+to+Peace/Palestinian+terror+since+2000/
 Palestinian%20violence%20and%20terrorism%20since%20September, 1 November 2004; William
 Robert Johnston, "Chronology of Terrorist Attacks in Israel, Part IV: 1993-2000," accessed at http://
 www.johnstonsarchive.net/terrorism/terrisrael-4.html, 25 October 2004; The New York Times, East
 Coast Final Edition, 2000-2005; al-Quds (Arabic: Jerusalem), 2000-2005; al-Quds al-Arabi (Arabic:
 Arab Jerusalem), 2000-2005.
 Discussion: The Dynamics of State Repression and Insurgency
 The second intifada broke out in September 2000 and its first suicide bombing
 occurred a month later. In July 2000, Palestinian support for Fatah stood at
 37 percent and support for Hamas at 10 percent. Sometime thereafter, both
 parties experienced a reversal of fortune. By July 2001, support for Fatah
 and Hamas stood at 29 percent and 17 percent, respectively. In March 1999,
 26 percent of Palestinians supported suicide bombing. Support for suicide
 bombing then began to soar, reaching 66 percent in December 2000. Thus,
 in the period July to December 2000, increasing support for suicide bombing
 was associated with falling support for Fatah and rising support for Hamas, as
 the outbidding thesis predicts.
 Whether these correlations amount to support for the outbidding thesis is
 another matter. We do not dismiss out of hand the notion that intense compe
 tition among militant organizations may on occasion result in tactical outbidding.
 Three hypotheses are worth researching in this regard. First, security coopera
This content downloaded from 213.244.124.19 on Thu, 12 Jan 2017 10:06:11 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 498 I POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY
 tion between Fatah, on the one hand, and Israel or the United States, on the
 other, may anger Hamas and incite strife between Hamas and Fatah. Second,
 the outbreak of discord between moderate and radical factions within Fatah
 may result in the formation of alliances between Fatah radicals and
 Hamas that, in turn, exacerbate interorganizational conflict. And third, policies
 that encourage Palestinians to think of only one organization as the proximate
 cause of their suffering (such as the financial squeeze imposed by Israel and the
 West on Hamas following its electoral victory in 2006) may increase discord be
 tween organizations. These hypotheses notwithstanding, much of the available
 information pertaining to what was happening on the ground during the second
 intifada suggests a certain level of cooperation, not just competition, among Pal
 estinian political organizations. And it is clear that beginning shortly after the
 outbreak of the second intifada, outbidding had little to do with variation in sup
 port for suicide bombing. Heteroscedastic is the term statisticians use to describe
 a regression model that is unequally accurate across the range of a dependent
 variable. We have shown that the regression model implicit in Bloom's analysis
 is, at best, heteroscedastic. The outbidding thesis is inapplicable to most of the
 second intifada insofar as it fails to account for variation in public support for
 suicide operations between December 2000 and December 2004 and insofar as
 the frequency of suicide bombings was not significantly associated with de
 creased support for secular organizations such as Fatah and increased support
 for Islamic fundamentalist organizations such as Hamas in that period.
 After Arafat's death in November 2004, Fatah assumed a nonviolent
 stance toward Israel. Hamas declared a ceasefire (hudna) and stuck to it quite
 closely. PU launched three suicide missions in the following fourteen months.
 Significantly, however, the popularity of Hamas continued to grow through
 out this period of relative calm, contrary to what the outbidding thesis would
 predict.30 Hamas won the January 2006 parliamentary election with a solid
 majority of 74 out of 132 seats despite abstaining from suicide bombing for
 more than a year. Meanwhile, the intransigent PIJ was wiped off the electoral
 map. The popularity of Hamas is the result of many factors, but it is an over
 simplification to think that Hamas has attracted popular support simply by en
 gaging in suicide bombing as a means of outbidding competing organizations.
 The dynamics of suicide bombing during the second intifada are portrayed
 in Figure 2. We contend that increasing Israeli state repression at time 1, in the
 second intifada's early stages, heightened social solidarity in Palestinian society
 and cooperation among insurgent organizations. These social processes led to
 a shift in insurgent tactics at time 2; rioting became less common and the fre
 quency of suicide bombing increased. Israel's response to the wave of suicide
 30 Hamas and PIJ were responsible for the 1993-1997 wave of suicide bombings. During that pe
 riod, support for Hamas was low, in the 9 to 10 percent range. Support for suicide bombing was also
 relatively low and it declined from 33 percent in June 1995 to 28 percent in August 1997. This is again
 contrary to what the outbidding thesis would predict. See "Palestine Opinion Pulse."
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 FIGURE 2
 The Dynamics of Suicide Bombing in the West Bank and Gaza
 attacks was to exercise more (and more effective) state repression at time 3.
 But events reached a turning point in March 2002. When Israel reoccupied the
 West Bank and parts of the Gaza Strip, its policy of conducting thorough
 house-to-house searches and stepping up the assassination and imprisonment
 of insurgent leaders thoroughly disrupted the planning and conduct of suicide
 operations. The construction of Israel's security wall cordoning off the West
 Bank from Israel proper had a similar effect. However, the effect of height
 ened state repression was twofold. First, the frequency of suicide bombing fell
 at time 4. Second, at the same time, heightened state repression led to a change
 of tactic. Thus, the insurgency did not die. Suicide bombers were replaced by
 Qassam rockets and kidnapping. At time 5, renewed state repression may be
 expected to encourage a new round of violence. Throughout most of the sec
 ond intifada, it seems, outbidding among Palestinian organizations had little to
 do with change in the frequency of suicide bombing.
 Some scholars have recently made sweeping generalizations about the appli
 cability of the outbidding thesis to all four waves of suicide attacks conducted by
 Palestinians since 1981 as well as suicide bombing campaigns launched by the
 Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka, the fedayeen in Kashmir, and the Kurdistan Workers'
 Party.31 These generalizations seem to be part of a broader tendency to adopt
 monocausal theories to explain the increasing popularity of suicide bombing.
 Robert Pape's widely publicized argument that suicide bombing is a strategic
 choice aimed at coercing occupying powers to give up territory is perhaps the
 best known of these monocausal theories, and we have criticized it in detail else
 31Ricolfi, "Palestinians," 92-101.
This content downloaded from 213.244.124.19 on Thu, 12 Jan 2017 10:06:11 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 500 I POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY
 where.32 Our analysis points to the need to move in the opposite direction?
 toward multivariate models that account for variation over time and place in
 the frequency of suicide bombings and support for the tactic. Motives for suicide
 bombing?the desire to liberate territory, the urge to disrupt peace negotiations,
 the search for retaliation and revenge, and the attempt to win popular support
 by outbidding internal political competitors?may all come into play to varying
 degrees in different times and places. On close inspection, monocausal explana
 tions of suicide bombing are bound to fail.*
 32 Brym and Araj, "Suicide Bombing."
 * We thank Samar Khaled for special tabulations of vital statistics and Nachman Ben-Yehudah,
 Baruch Kimmerling, Malcolm MacKinnon, Deanna Pikkov, and James Ron for critical comments on
 a draft of this paper. We are also grateful to PSQ's reviewers, who offered insightful criticisms of the
 first draft that led to its improvement.
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